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Abstract
Against a background of institutional fragmentation and lack of coordination 
among the respective role players, the notion of co-management of natural 
resources has emerged in many countries around the world as the most 
promising institutional prospect for resolving resource conflicts and building 
partnerships in conservation and management between local actors and 
government authorities. In South Africa, like elsewhere, the fragmentation and 
lack of coordination among the various executing agencies represent a significant 
hurdle and a barrier to successfully integrated environmental governance. 
Following international trends, and supported by the constitutional vision of 
cooperative governance and the transformation agenda of the government – 
which created an openness to new and alternative service-delivery mechanisms 
– innovative new networked regional and community-based natural resource 
governance systems emerged in the late 1990s.
These new forms of cooperative management of natural resources, and 
in particular the role of networks and partnerships, have led to a new and 
growing general interest in evaluating cooperative environmental governance 
systems. Following a broadly institutionalist approach, which is useful for 
studying situations of governance where policy formulation and implementation 
involve a wide range of actors, a diagnostic tool was developed to facilitate 
opportunities for organisational and social learning.  The perceived usefulness 
of having such a tool was put to the test  by applying it to two case studies in the 
Western Cape, namely the Kogelberg Biosphere Reserve and the Olifants-Doorn 
Catchment Management Agency. In this article the characteristics of two evolving 
environmental governance systems are mapped, using the framework to assess 
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and refine its usefulness in contributing to our knowledge and understanding of 
building social capital and institutional capacity in decentralised and networked 
governance settings.
Keywords:  cooperative environmental management, decentralisation, 
environmental governance, institutional capacity, institutional 
fragmentation, network analysis, networks, social capital 
1 INTRODUCTION
The complexity and magnitude of today’s challenges for natural resource 
management require not only a common focus, but also cooperation among many 
different sectors to make the best of resources and expertise. In South Africa, like 
elsewhere, institutional fragmentation and lack of coordination among the various 
executing agencies represent a significant hurdle and a barrier to successfully 
integrated environmental governance. It is against this background that the notion 
of co-management of natural resources has emerged in many countries around the 
world as the most promising institutional prospect for resolving resource conflicts 
and building partnerships in conservation and management between local actors and 
government authorities (Zachrisson 2004: 3).
South Africa has followed international trends, and consequently innovative new 
networked regional and community-based natural resource governance systems 
emerged in the late 1990s; Working for Water, one of the government’s flagship 
programmes, was the first to be initiated in 1995. The establishment of the first 
biosphere reserve dates back only to 1998, while the first of the water catchment 
management agencies (CMAs) was created seven years after being legislatively 
mandated in 1998. Some other initiatives, such as Cape Action Plan for People 
and Environment (CAPE), CoastCare, LandCare, Working on Fire and Working 
for Wetlands, were initiated only in the past five years. The combined approach of 
government decentralisation and a devolution of responsibility for natural resources 
to local communities was generally informed by an approach advocated by the 
United Nations 1992 Rio Earth Summit (Müller 2007a: 45). The transformation 
agenda of the new government also created a window of opportunity to consider and 
experiment with alternative service delivery mechanisms for public action. It was 
also clear that there was a unique opportunity to align and mobilise the variety of 
approaches and capabilities of the executing agencies towards achieving the vision 
of cooperative governance created by the 1996 constitution of South Africa.
These new forms of cooperative management of natural resources, and in 
particular the role of networks and partnerships, have led to a new and growing 
general interest in evaluating cooperation and collaboration (Saglie 2006: 14). 
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Because of the perceived usefulness of having a tool to identify, describe and 
compare the characteristics of environmental governance systems in a systematic 
manner, an assessment framework was developed by Müller (2007b: 18–32). In 
this article the framework is applied to two case studies – the Kogelberg Biosphere 
Reserve and the Olifants-Doorn Catchment Management Agency – to determine its 
usefulness in contributing to our knowledge and understanding in this regard.  
2  GOveRNANCe, sOCIAl CApITAl AND INsTITUTIONAl 
CApACITY
The shift towards the cooperative management of natural resources coincided with 
the increasing use of the term ‘governance’ instead of ‘government’ internationally, 
to signify that the emphasis is on what Salamon (2002: 8) argues is perhaps the 
central reality of public problem solving for the foreseeable future, namely its 
collaborative nature and its reliance on a wide array of third parties in addition to 
government to address public problems and pursue public purposes. Furthermore, 
the governance approach, according to Saglie (2006: 12), looks beyond the formal 
structures and instead focuses on the actors participating both inside and outside 
the formal allocation of power. In this regard the institutionalist framework is, in 
Rydin’s (2006: 17) opinion, particularly useful for studying situations of governance 
where policy formulation and implementation involve a wide range of actors. 
The core of the institutionalist perspective is the insight that organisational 
arrangements on their own do not provide an adequate explanation of dynamics and 
outcomes. A key feature of institutionalism is that insights will be revealed by looking 
at the combination of the formal and informal, the explicit and implicit aspects of 
how organisations work (sometimes referred to as the cultural dimensions). The core 
of an institutionalist analysis is comprised of two elements: firstly, network analysis, 
where organisational arrangements are mapped to understand how the linkages 
between actors are created; and secondly, an attention to the cultural dimensions, 
i.e. the norms, values, routines and everyday working practices whereby the actors 
involved behave and construct their roles (ibid: 15–20).
The concepts of social capital and institutional capacity are central in the 
institutionalist approach. According to Rydin (ibid: 15) these two concepts are 
slightly different yet overlapping ways of conceptualising the nature and operation 
of networks. Social capital is understood here as being constituted by dense networks 
of relationships between actors based on trust, mutuality (meaning recognition of 
mutual interdependence and hence interests in common) and reciprocity (meaning a 
relationship whereby the behaviour of another actor can occur in the justified belief 
of other actors behaving in a certain way). The institutional capacity model, on the 
Polit 27 (1) 2008 _ 3.indd   88 2008/06/21   03:06:14 PM
Assessing cooperative environmental governance systems: the cases of the Kogelberg 
Biosphere reserve and the Olifants-Doorn catchment Management Agency
89
other hand, is typically multidimensional, comprised of three or four types of capital 
or resources: intellectual/knowledge resources; social/relational resources, political/
mobilisation capacity and sometimes material capital (ibid: 20–27).
Müller (2004: 410) argues that there is no single blueprint or model for achieving 
cooperation that will suffice for all problems and contexts. The challenge is to get 
the mix right: combinations of approach(es) and governance mode(s) will have to 
fit the type of problem, work within the constraints and opportunities offered by 
the existing organisational landscape/capacity, and take the local political, social, 
economic and cultural contexts into consideration, and adapt and innovate within 
that space. In these circumstances complexity and uncertainty may be central to 
network structures and relatively difficult to document, predict and model. 
These new forms of cooperative management of natural resources, and in particular 
the role of networks and partnerships, have led to a new and growing general 
interest in evaluating cooperation and collaboration (Saglie 2006: 14). Because 
of the perceived usefulness of having a tool to identify, describe and compare the 
characteristics of environmental governance systems in a systematic manner, an 
assessment framework was developed (see Table 1 below), drawing primarily on 
the work of Peters (1998: 295–311), Nelson and Weschler (1998: 565–576), the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Policy Brief 
(2002) and Margerum and Born (2000: 5–21).
Table 1: Framework for the assessment of environmental governance 
structures (adapted from Müller 2007b)
Criteria Description
Scope The set of concerns which is addressed through the 
coordination arrangements, regardless of whether they are 
environmental policies or management activities
Position The stakeholders and role players involved in the 
coordination activities, and their roles in the setting (e.g. 
agency, user group, coordinator, etc.)
Boundary How specific individuals and stakeholders enter or leave 
those positions (e.g. whether by means of appointment, 
nomination or election)
Authority The coordination activities (i.e. information exchange or 
conflict resolution) in which position holders can or cannot 
participate, as well as the constraints on autonomy and/
or individual action and the basis of power (e.g. law, plan, 




The types, forms, timing and processes of information 
exchange among the different position holders (e.g. shared 
database, monthly meetings or electronic networks)
Polit 27 (1) 2008 _ 3.indd   89 2008/06/21   03:06:14 PM
Kobus Müller
90
Decision making The position holders’ procedure for making collective 
decisions and resolving conflicts (e.g. by means of general 
consensus or voting procedures)
Pluriformity The extent to which the networks are integrated, in so far 
as this will influence their likelihood of producing effective 
coordination (such as their level of integration determining 
whether they can be treated as a single organisation, or need 
to be treated as semi-autonomous organisations)
Interdependence The extent of interdependence between the different entities 
making up the network, in so far as this influences styles of 
interaction and relationships (e.g. loosely coupled or closely 
interconnected), which in turn influences their likelihood of 
producing effective coordination
Formality The level of formality, in so far as this influences their 
likelihood of producing effective coordination
Instruments The nature of the instruments used (i.e. planning, formal 
regulations or contracts) as this influences their likelihood of 
producing effective coordination
Leadership The presence of clear government commitment and 
leadership at the highest level, effectively communicated 




The degree to which jurisdictions are aware of, and primed 
for, engaging each other in collaborative governance of the 
different entities in terms of
the level of citizen and community interest and involvement
the availability of existing institutions and organisations for 
regional governance
the degree of practical experience in formal and informal 
cross-sectional coordination and cooperation
the level of knowledge  and appreciation of the missions, 
goals and objectives of the other participants
Redundancy This occurs where overlap is an outcome of cooperative 
arrangements with two or more organisations performing the 
same task
Incoherence This arises where cooperative arrangements are 
characterised by policies with the same clients, who have 
different goals and requirements
Lacunae These are marked by a failure of the cooperative 
arrangements, because of the absence of any organisation 
performing a necessary task
The examples of networked cooperative governance models referred to in the 
Introduction above are relatively new in the field of natural resource management 
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for South Africa. The systems are, therefore, still evolving and present us with 
a window of opportunity for studying and learning from both our successes and 
failures. In the next section the tool will be applied to map the characteristics of 
the cooperative governance systems in the two selected case studies, to judge its 
potential usefulness in facilitating both organisational and social learning.
3. ApplICATION OF AssessMeNT FRAMeWORK
The framework was applied to the Olifants-Doorn Catchment Management Agency 
and the Kogelberg Biosphere Reserve. The evaluation is primarily a qualitative 
judgment based on the literature reviewed – the Proposal for the Establishment of 
the Olifants-Doorn Catchment Management Agency (DWAF 2005) and the Draft 
Strategic Management Framework (SMF) for the Kogelberg Biosphere Reserve 
(2006) are the primary source documents for the two case studies respectively – and 
interviews with key individuals involved in both systems (to fill in some gaps to 
determine the usefulness of the framework). As the two governance structures are 
still evolving – the Olifants-Doorn Catchment Management Agency, for example, 
had not yet been formally established at the time of writing – it is not possible yet 
to describe and analyse the governance systems in terms of all the criteria of the 
assessment framework. 
The Olifants-Doorn Catchment Management Agency1
The • scope of the CMA is determined by law: the National Water Act (Act 36 
of 1998) makes provision for the establishment of a Catchment Management 
Authority (CMA) in the Olifants-Doorn Water Management Area (WMA) – one 
of 19 WMAs in South Africa. The CMA is a unique legal entity and it may have 
a wide range of potential duties, powers and functions relating to the ‘protection, 
use, development, conservation, management and control of water resources’ 
(RSA 1998). 
Position and boundary:•	  the CMA is governed by a Governing Board consisting 
of between 9 to 15 members appointed to their positions by the Minister of Water 
Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) on the formal recommendations of an Advisory 
Committee set up by DWAF specifically for this purpose. The board must be 
representative of stakeholders (water user groups, other water interest groups 
and various local and national government organs)2 in the Olifants-Doorn 
WMA; the stakeholders put forward nominations to the minister who decides 
which individuals to appoint, taking into consideration the need for expertise, 
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balance of social, economic and ecological interests, as well as issues of gender, 
race and community representation.
The delegation of functions to the CMA is outlined in the National Water Act • 
(1998) and its authority in terms of powers and duties is set out in Schedule 3 
of the Act. When it begins operating, the CMA will automatically have certain 
inherent powers and initial functions which the act gives to it. These ‘initial’ 
functions revolve around the water resources strategy, institutional coordination, 
cooperative governance, stakeholder communication and administrative 
activities. All other powers, duties and functions of a CMA will be transferred to 
it by the minister over a period of time (± 10 years) in staged phases (three phases 
are foreseen in the proposal); the rate at which this is done will be dependent on 
the available capacity and resources until the CMA has developed into a fully-
fledged water management institution or ‘responsible authority’, which will be 
largely financed through the collection of water use charges. Apart from the 
income generated from water use charges, the Olifants-Doorn CMA will also 
obtain (and will be largely dependent on obtaining) seed funding from DWAF 
during the establishment phase of the CMA.  
Information and knowledge management:•	  it would seem that adequate 
attention was devoted (during the Olifants-Doorn multi-stakeholder process 
(MSP)) to the establishment of the CMA to address the communication needs and 
vehicles of communication to reach the stakeholders, taking the characteristics 
of the audience into account (i.e. newsletters, pamphlets, meetings/workshops, 
newspaper articles and radio were identified as the priority communication 
media over some more technically sophisticated media such as television or 
the internet). All official documentation was also made available on DWAF’s 
website. The CMA, once established, will also require the necessary information 
systems to be able to operate effectively. These include basic management support 
systems such as internet access, e-mail, billing, debtors, asset management, 
databases, etc. Due to the great diversity of information that is relevant to its 
operation, and the nature of its geographical distribution, the CMA will require a 
sophisticated GIS (Geographical Information System). The initial development 
and implementation of such a system will have to be provided by DWAF, if 
the CMA is to start playing a meaningful role in its area of jurisdiction (DWAF 
2005b: 64).
As the governing board hasn’t been established yet, the procedures which will • 
be adopted for making collective decisions and resolving conflicts are unclear at 
this point. However, in the letter and sprit of the law, as stated in the preamble of 
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the National Water Act, 1996 (Act 96 of 1998), in which the need is recognised 
‘for the integrated management of all aspects of water resources and, where 
appropriate, the delegation of management functions to regional or catchment 
level so to enable everyone to participate’, one could expect that a consensus-
seeking cooperative decision-making approach will be adopted. The multi-
stakeholder process (2001–2003) leading up to the adoption of the proposal 
document also involved an extensive process of stakeholder consultation and 
public involvement to ensure local participation.
It has been proposed that the Olifants-Doorn CMA organisationally implement a • 
decentralised network model with a committee approach supported by extensive 
outsourcing of operational functions to emerging service providers, existing 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations 
(CBOs), water users associations (WUAs), the district and local municipalities 
and consultants. The CMA, with a small staff component of 5 to 26 people, will 
concentrate on the managerial and administrative functions related to integrated 
water resource management (WRM). A Catchment Management Committee 
will be established, which is representative of all stakeholders, and will further 
ensure the continued involvement of stakeholders, thus promoting cooperative 
governance and a participatory approach in all matters pertaining to water 
resource management (DWAF 2005b: 55–58). In terms of the pluriformity 
criterion, one can only speculate on the extent to which the network will be 
integrated: on the one hand, the fact that the CMA does not see itself getting 
involved in the operating side might strengthen its strategic focus and role in 
promoting cooperative governance; on the other hand, it is acknowledged that 
the Olifants-Doorn CMA’s biggest challenge will be to ensure and maintain 
cooperative governance between itself and the numerous institutions that, in one 
way or another, are involved in water matters in its WMA.  
Again, in terms of the • interdependence (i.e. loosely coupled or closely 
interconnected) between the different entities making up the network, which 
could influence the likelihood of producing effective coordination, they would 
have specific delegated or outsourced functions. It could be argued, therefore, 
that they are not all that interdependent and that effective coordination could be 
relatively easily achieved by a CMA focusing on effective strategic integration.
Although the CMA will have to develop its own operating policies and procedures • 
once it starts functioning, the national legislative framework, water resources 
management strategies and DWAF’s guidelines provide a level of formality 
which should enhance the likelihood of producing effective coordination.
Polit 27 (1) 2008 _ 3.indd   93 2008/06/21   03:06:16 PM
Kobus Müller
94
An important • instrument towards integrated water resource management will 
be the development – by the governing board of the CMA – of a catchment 
management strategy for the Olifants-Doorn WMA as one of its initial functions. 
The CMA will be supported by DWAF, which has developed a situation 
assessment called the internal strategic perspective to aid this process.
Because the Olifants-Doorn governing board has not yet been established, • 
leadership has been provided by DWAF, both on the strategic level (by the 
national vision and policy for WRM), but also at the catchment level (by the 
professional commitment of the public administration technocrats who were 
responsible for activating, orchestrating and modulating the multi-stakeholder 
process leading up to the establishment of the CMA). During the MSP attention 
was also given to building leadership capacity through programmes geared to 
equip persons from historically disadvantaged backgrounds with the skills to 
enable them to participate meaningfully in integrated water resource management 
issues.
The question of • institutional readiness is interesting, because the CMA is a 
new entity: the observation that the Olifants-Doorn multi-stakeholder process 
required a lot of time, as well as human and financial resources, might facilitate 
the achievement of collaborative governance in the long term, as it raises the 
level of citizen and community interest and involvement. Practical experience 
in formal and informal cross-sectional coordination and cooperation builds 
trust between the stakeholders and increases the knowledge and appreciation 
of integrated water resources management (IWRM) and the interests of other 
participants.
It is too early to comment on the issues of • redundancy, incoherence or lacunae 
in so far as they impact on cooperative arrangements for integrated water 
resources management in the Olifants-Doorn WMA, but major problems are 
not foreseen.
The Kogelberg Biosphere Reserve (KBR)3
The Kogelberg Biosphere Reserve (KBR), South Africa’s first biosphere reserve, 
was registered with UNESCO in 1998 under its Man and the Biosphere (MAB) 
programme after an eight-year establishment process. The KBR covers a land area 
of some 103 629 ha and includes a marine portion of 24 500 ha.
The KBR is a voluntary association between the local community, statutory • 
authorities, land owners and local businesses. Apart from the general guideline 
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that the KBR (SMF 2006: 17) must align itself with the primary functions 
of biosphere reserves as defined by UNESCO (biodiversity conservation, 
developmental and research/logistic), the scope is determined by a shared 
vision and mission between stakeholders to enable them to work together and 
collectively add value. A vision and mission statement have been put forward in 
the SMF (2006: 12–16) towards attaining this. The proposed mission is that the 
Kogelberg Biosphere Reserve is to be managed in accordance with UNESCO’s 
MAB programme. The entity managing the KBR is a partnership between 
different stakeholders who are working together to establish Kogelberg as a 
model of sustainable development (SMF 2006: 16).
After its establishment the KBR was managed by a management committee • 
consisting of 35 representative stakeholders.4 In 2002 the management committee 
was dissolved and replaced by the Kogelberg Biosphere Reserve Company 
(KBRC) – a Section 21 ‘not-for-profit’ company – as it was thought that such an 
entity would facilitate improved management of the KBR. The KBRC is steered 
by a board of directors (3 to 8 directors) to manage the biosphere reserve in 
terms of the requirements of the MAB programme. The first board of directors 
was appointed by the management committee after a public nomination process. 
The representivity of the company’s directors, however, is widely questioned 
and it is suggested in the SMF that when the current interim board is replaced, 
attention should be given to ensuring that the new board is representative of the 
local communities as well as key statutory authorities active in the area (SMF 
2006: 38–41). It is not clear at this point how the directors will be appointed 
(elected by members?) in future, nor how decision making will take place.
Biosphere reserves currently have no specific legal basis in South Africa, but • 
possible options are emerging for strengthening the legal status of KBR (e.g. 
the provincial government in the Western Cape is in the process of developing 
enabling legislation for biosphere reserves), which could provide a level of 
authority to enhance the likelihood of producing effective coordination by 
binding biosphere reserve partners to agreements reached through the signing of 
Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) and Service Level Agreements (SLAs) 
(SMF 2006: 5–6).
Information and knowledge management:•	  it has been proposed in the 
management plan (SMF 2006: 17–35) that, as part of the KBRC’s strategic 
management goal to raise general awareness of the KBR and build a broad-
based understanding of the MAB programme, it should develop a knowledge-
management system and host, and maintain a ‘one-stop’ database for the KBR, 
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as well as develop and maintain KBR communication, education and outreach 
strategies.
It has been proposed that the KBRC organisationally seek to maintain a small, • 
cost-effective and innovative entity to manage the KBR, which focuses on 
carrying out the primary functions of a biosphere reserve and leverages support 
for its activities through effective partnerships with other government agencies, 
the private sector and civil society. The challenge the KBRC faces in terms of the 
pluriformity criterion is to ensure the implementation of the KBR management 
plan by way of building and formalising partnerships through MOUs and SLAs 
between the KBRC and suitable implementation agents (SMF 2006: 5–6, 41).
In terms of the • interdependence criterion it can be observed that the different 
entities making up the KBR ‘community’, as it is now, are loosely coupled; if 
they are not linked more tightly through the SMF, MoUs and SLAs, this could 
negatively influence the likelihood of producing effective coordination. 
The current legal and operational ‘• informality’ of the biosphere reserve, with 
a focus on sustaining cooperative governance relationships across the different 
agencies and institutions operating in the KBR and actively promoting the 
enforcement and implementation of current enabling legislation and policies, 
will continue in the short and medium term as a result of the uncertain legal 
status of biosphere reserves in South Africa. The signing of MoUs and SLAs, as 
foreseen in the SMF, could formalise relationships and positively influence the 
likelihood of producing effective coordination (SMF 2006: 37).
The strategic management framework (SMF), once finalised, will be an • 
important instrument towards achieving the integrated management of 
the KBR. The SMF will be comprised of, firstly, a strategic plan to broadly 
define the strategic direction that the company should take in moving forward; 
secondly, a management plan with specific details on how the company is going 
to undertake its core business activities over the medium term (three years); 
and thirdly, a corporate plan specifying the actions required to restructure the 
KBRC institutionally and make it an effective management agent. In addition 
to the signing of MoUs and SLAs with partners, an overarching performance 
measurement, review and reporting system is to be developed to monitor and 
review the progress of the KBRC in meeting the targets set by the management 
plan (SMF 2006: 2).
To date the KBRC has not met the challenge of building effective partnerships • 
between KBR stakeholders: there is as yet no broad-based community support 
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for a voluntary association between different interests groups, who are meant 
to subscribe to similar objectives, aspire to a common vision and share similar 
values.5 The KBRC failed to provide effective leadership after its establishment 
in 2002 in the absence of a plan to guide its activities, there are no secure sources 
of funding, and there is inadequate administrative and technical support to the 
board of directors. In the absence of the KBRC demonstrating its presence in the 
area, a more vocal and prominent environmental interest group, the Kogelberg 
Biosphere Association (KOBIO) has assumed the role of representing the 
KBR’s interests. This group primarily performs an advocacy role, which can 
compromise the KBR’s partnership-building requirements. By 2004 the KBRC 
was, for all practical purposes, considered an operational failure and had to be 
revived at the end of 2004 through the establishment of a technical committee 
comprised of representatives from provincial and local government, as well as 
representatives from the KBR’s core (CapeNature), buffer and transition areas 
to support the KBRC directors. The technical committee secured funding in 
2005 to appoint consultants to develop the strategic management framework 
(SMF 2006: 1, 38).
Factors complicating management of the KBR (which relate to the question of • 
institutional readiness) include the complex legal framework, the overlapping 
jurisdictions between various statutory authorities, the poor delivery capacity of 
local government, and a politically unstable climate (SMF 2006: 6).
Issues of • redundancy, incoherence or lacunae in so far as they impact on 
cooperative arrangements for integrated environmental management of the 
KBR have been identified as the lack of clarity and poor coordination across 
national, provincial and local governance agencies within the KBR as a result of 
overlapping legal mandates; and the operational relationship between new legally 
constituted co-management structures (such as the Catchment Management 
Agency in terms of the National Water Act and the Fire Protection Association 
in terms of the Veld and Forest Fire Act) and the KBR structures, which need 
clarification (SMF 2006: 37).
A summary of the assessment is presented below in Table 2:
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Table 2: Comparison between the Olifants-Doorn Catchment Management 
Agency and the Kogelberg Biosphere Reserve
Criteria CMA Biosphere
Scope Specific legislative mandate, 
confined to water resources 
management
Broad UNESCO guidelines, 
KBR vision and mission
Position Representativeness of 
stakeholders, and mandated 




because of greater role 
ambiguity and fluidness of 
stakeholders
Boundary Nominated by stakeholders, 
appointed by minister / 
governing board / water 
management institution
First board chosen by 
ManCom after public 
nomination process: future 
board of directors elected 
by members after public 
nomination process, open 
membership? 
Authority Exercised in terms of 
legislation, delegated /






through MOUs and SLAs 
Information Communication strategy 
during MSPs included 
newsletters, pamphlets, 
meetings/workshops, 
newspaper articles and 
radio. Information shared 
through catchment 
forums and other water 
management institutions; 
basic management support 
systems and GIS to be 
developed
A knowledge-management 
system and a ‘one-stop’ 
database for the KBR 
proposed in SMF as well as 
communication, education 
and outreach strategies 
to raise awareness of 
KBR; SMF develop trough 




Sufficient consensus during 
establishment process 
Majority of votes of those 
present?
Pluriformity Decentralised network 
model tightly coupled 
by specific delegated or 
outsourced functions by the 
CMA
A loosely coupled 
network of autonomous 
organisations could be 
tightened up through SMF, 
MOUs and SLAs 
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Interdependence Low if particular WUAs 
and catchment committee 
are delegated /assigned /
contracted (for) particular 
functions?
High if the effectiveness of 
management depends on 
the voluntary cooperation 





Legislative power, water 
resources strategy, 
contracts, levies; catchment 
management strategy to be 





MOUs, SLAs, incentives, 
future enabling provincial 
legislation?
Leadership Strategic by DWAF through 
vision and policy for WRM; 
at catchment level through 
initiation and facilitation 
of MSP; capacity building 
programmes to enable 
meaningful participation in 
integrated water resource 
management issues
KBRC failed to build 
effective partnerships 
between KBR stakeholders; 
absence of a strategic 
plan, lack of  funding, and 
inadequate administrative 
and technical support; 





participation, some existing 
institutions but new CMA 
have to be established, 
some practical experience, 
and knowledge and 
appreciation of other 
participants’ missions 
developed during MSP
Low: complex legal 
framework, the overlapping 
jurisdictions between 
various statutory 
authorities, the poor 
delivery capacity of 
local government, and a 
politically unstable climate
Redundancy Low because networked 
entities will have specific 
delegated or outsourced 
functions?
High: overlapping legal 
mandates between 
government agencies in 
KBR; relationships with 
other new legally mandated 
co-management structures 
Incoherence Low: process nationally 
driven, national and local, 
water resources strategies, 




KBRC and other new 
legally mandated co-
management structures as 
well as existing government 
agencies 
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Lacunae Low Probability high: unfunded 
mandates constrain 
implementation through 
existing agencies, lack of 
capacity and resources  
limit contracting out  
4 CONClUsION
The emergence in South Africa over the past decade of new cooperative environmental 
governance systems at regional or local level is an exciting development that 
has followed international trends. These structures normally take the form of 
decentralised sets of formal and informal agreements among diverse stakeholders in 
networks and partnerships. These new forms of cooperative management of natural 
resources have led to a new and growing general interest in evaluating cooperation 
and collaboration. However, analysing and assessing networks and partnerships with 
their range of structural possibilities with the different elements held together by 
ties of authority, exchange relations and/or common interest-based coalitions could 
pose a major challenge. In these organisational networks the degree of influence, as 
exercised across a wide range of actors, is relatively difficult to document, predict 
and model. In other words, the complexity and uncertainty so central to network 
structures could make analyses and comparison very difficult, if not impossible.
In pursuing this challenge the research reported in this article set out to assess the 
potential usefulness of a tool developed on the basis of a review of the theoretical 
literature on institutional fragmentation, integration, collaboration and cooperation. 
The tool consists of an assessment framework with a set of 15 criteria which could 
be used to identify, describe and compare the characteristics of environmental 
governance systems in a systematic manner. In this research application the tool is 
tested by applying it to two case studies in the Western Cape: the Olifants-Doorn 
Catchment Management Agency (CMA) and the Kogelberg Biosphere Reserve 
(KBR). The evaluation is primarily a qualitative judgment based on a study of 
documents as the primary source, and interviews with key individuals in both 
systems to fill in some gaps. 
The obvious limitation of this research is that both kinds of cooperative governance 
systems in the case studies are new to South Africa and as such are still evolving. 
Some of the observations therefore are based on how the stakeholders see the future 
evolving according to the planning documents, and are not a reflection of current 
or past reality. However, the sensitivity of the tool seems to be illustrated by the 
clarity with which the nature of the two cooperative systems has been captured: the 
establishment of the CMA is directed from the centre by means of a well-designed 
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and tightly managed process of stakeholder consultation, mandated and regulated 
by law and confined to water resources management. The governance structure 
consists of a representative board with formal appointment procedures, and its 
authority and functions are formally exercised in terms of legislation. The CMA 
is a new institution, but it may delegate or outsource functions utilising a network 
model. Leadership is provided at the strategic level by DWAF’s water resource 
management vision and policy, and at catchment level through a multi-stakeholder 
process which achieved high participation, empowerment and buy-in. With a high 
degree of institutional readiness, serious problems of overlap, policy incoherence or 
major gaps are not foreseen.
The KBR, on the other hand, can be characterised as a loosely coupled self-
organising system in which citizen and interest-group involvement played a major 
role in its establishment, with the facilitation of, and support by, the provincial and 
national governments. Its scope is defined within the broad UNESCO guidelines 
and the KBR’s own vision and mission statements, but it is currently without a 
specific legal basis. Its governance structure has evolved from a management 
committee to a not-for-profit company (KBRC) and, although the first board of 
directors was appointed after a public nomination process, future membership and 
processes are unclear. The representivity of the board is also widely questioned. 
The KBRC sees itself as a small, cost-effective ‘linking-pin’ entity whose decisions 
are implemented by a network of loosely coupled autonomous partner institutions 
through MOUs and SLAs. The leadership of the KBRC failed to build effective 
partnerships between KBR stakeholders, which opened up the space for interest 
groups (KOBIO) to ‘capture’ or assume leadership roles. By 2004 the KBRC was, 
for all practical purposes, considered an operational failure and had to be revived 
at the end of 2004 through the establishment of a technical advisory committee to 
support the board. The degree of institutional readiness for collaboration could be 
described as problematic: a complex legal framework with overlapping jurisdictions 
and unfunded mandates between various statutory authorities and other new legally 
mandated co-management structures, the lack of capacity and resources limit 
contracting out, poor delivery capacity of local government and a politically unstable 
climate.
It seems reasonable to conclude that the assessment tool proved useful, at least, 
at the initial ‘mapping’ step of any attempt towards evaluating cooperative systems. 
The tool may also point to the specific informal dimensions beyond the formal 
which need to be investigated to get an adequate explanation of the dynamics and 
outcomes. We might, for example, be interested in how the relationships of trust, 
reciprocity and mutuality, or the leadership role of key individuals, both potential 
key success factors in the two case studies (captured in the concept of social capital) 
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may be helpful in explaining the effectiveness of the institutional arrangements for 
natural resource management. These norms, values, routines and everyday working 
practices (or cultural dimensions, in the language of social capital), whereby the actors 
involved behave and construct their roles, are beyond the reach of the assessment 
tool and will have be revealed through interviews, document analysis and non-
participant observation of the working of the network. We know that no one set of 
institutional arrangements can solve all types of collective problems: to be effective, 
institutions need to be designed in ways that satisfy particular types of problems. 
There is a growing body of evidence that suggests that social capital could have an 
enormous effect on natural resource management and even the effectiveness and 
functioning of governments. These emerging governance structures could therefore 
offer an exciting window of opportunity for social and organisational learning at 
this point in time in post-apartheid South Africa’s development, given the country’s 
context and history
NOTes
1.  This section is primarily based on the Proposal for the Establishment of the Olifants-
Doorn Catchment Management Agency, Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. It 
will be referred to as DWAF 2005b.
2.  In general, membership consists of the following categories: farmers’ associations, 
poor farmer organisations, local authorities (B municipalities), district municipalities 
(C municipalities), industry and business, water user associations, conservation and 
environmental organisations, community action committees, ratepayers’ associations, 
reconstruction and development forums, organised labour, nature conservation organi-
sations, the Working for Water Programme, the Department of Planning, Local Govern-
ment and Housing: Provincial Administrations of the Northern and the Western Cape, 
the Department of Agriculture: Provincial Administrations of the Northern & Western 
Cape, and DWAF (Northern and Western Cape).
3.  This section is primarily based on the Draft Strategic Management Framework for the 
Kogelberg Biosphere Reserve (SMF), a discussion document prepared by consultants 
(iKapa Enviroplan) for the Kogelberg Reserve Company (KBRC) in 2006. It will be 
referenced as SMF 2006.
4.  The KBR ‘community’ includes the following stakeholder groups: (1) residents, com-
munity-based organisations, local businesses and the owners or occupiers of land, espe-
cially farmers (as major land owners), HDCs and fishermen; (2) visitors and investors; 
(3) statutory authorities, of which CapeNature, South African National Biodiversity 
Institute (SANBI), DWAF, South African Forestry Company (Safcol), other provincial 
and national departments, and the local authorities that have jurisdiction in the KBR, 
namely the City of Cape Town, Overberg District Municipality, Overstrand Municipal-
ity and Theewaterskloof Municipality are the most important and (4) civil society and 
research institutions (KOBIO, WWF, Botanical Society, CAPE, UCT, SU, UWC).
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5.  For a historical analyses of the collapse of the KBRC and interest group dynamics, see 
Hyman’s 2006 thesis ‘How a powerful minority has exploited UNESCO Biosphere 
Reserve status: a case study of the Kogelberg Biosphere Reserve, South Africa’.
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